Search results - 7 results

Opinion: Airtightness for Decontamination by Fumigation of High-Containment Laboratories

airtightness. Starting from a previous study in which we measured the airtightness in 4 BSL-3 laboratories with blower-door tests, we discuss the connection between airtightness and a successful decontamination ...

Airtightness in Belgian high biocontainment facilities

D/2016/2505/14 Accession Number: D/2016/2505/14 Keywords: airtightness biosafety BSL-3 Recommendations Abstract: Following a discussion in 2011 at the meeting of the European Joint Enforcement Group of Contained ...

In vitro surrogate models to aid in the development of antivirals for the containment of foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks.

ERAV surrogate models reported here can be manipulated in BSL-2 laboratories and may facilitate studies to unravel the mechanism of action of novel FMDV  inhibitors. Health Topics:  Animal health ...

Biosafety risk assessment and management of laboratory-derived influenza A (H5N1) viruses transmissible in ferrets

in the context of the European Union regulatory framework and recommend that laboratory-derived HPAI A (H5N1) viruses transmissible in ferrets should be handled in biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) facilities ...

Biosafety recommendations for the contained use of Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex isolates in industrialized countries

analysis AS Belgium biosafety BSL-3 classification Clinical containment Countries culture developed countries Diagnosis disease Diseases Dna Group Human identification incidence INFECTION Infectious ...

Biosafety risk assessment of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) coronavirus and containment measures for the diagnostic and research laboratories

performed under Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) conditions. Diagnostic activities involving non-inactivated clinical specimens associated with SARS should be carried out under BSL-2 containment with BSL-3 safety ...

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