%0 Journal Article %J Applied Biosafety %D 2019 %T Opinion: Airtightness for Decontamination by Fumigation of High-Containment Laboratories %A Fanny Coppens %A Nicolas Willemarck %A Didier Breyer %K airtightness %K Decontamination %K fumigation %K high-containment %K Hydrogen Peroxide %X

Introduction:

While the European legislation states that laboratories of high-containment must be sealable for fumigation, they do not prescribe a minimal value for airtightness. Starting from a previous study in which we measured the airtightness in 4 BSL-3 laboratories with blower-door tests, we discuss the connection between airtightness and a successful decontamination by fumigation.

Methods:

Biological indicators (BIs) consisting of spores of Geobacillus stearothermophilus on metal disks were laid out in laboratories of different levels of airtightness before performing a fumigation with aerosolized hydrogen peroxide using an automated device, according to the manufacturer’s instructions.

Results:

Incubation of all BI disks placed in the facility with the highest level of airtightness showed complete inactivation of spores. However, in the facility with a lower level of airtightness, not all spores were inactivated.

Discussion:

Air leaks might be a factor in the outcome of the decontamination of a room by fumigation, as seen in the laboratory with a lower level of airtightness, but other factors associated with the fumigation process might also be critical for a successful decontamination.

Conclusion:

We argue that a validation of the decontamination procedure, before first use or after important renovations of a laboratory of high-containment, is a more effective endpoint than reaching a predefined level of airtightness.

%B Applied Biosafety %8 2019-08-27 %G eng %R 10.1177/1535676019871370 %0 Report %D 2018 %T Monitoring of Laboratory-Acquired Infections %A Nicolas Willemarck %A Greet Smets %A Emilie Descamps %A Fanny Coppens %K biosafety %K Laboratory-acquired infections %K LAIs %K legislation %K Monitoring %X

In laboratories of universities, hospitals, research institutes and companies, activities are carried out on, and with micro-organisms that have a diverse ability to cause disease. The purpose of these activities can be to study or diagnose disease processes, to gain knowledge on biological processes, or to develop new medicines, foods, or vaccines. To protect both humans and the environment from possible harmful effects from these activities, a number of safety measures are in place regarding containment in laboratories and training of personnel. In addition, the safety measures that are enforced have been incorporated in professional standards that correspond to national and international legislation. Despite these measures, incidental infections occur during laboratory activities, so-called laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs). The occurrence of LAIs can be an indication of potentially hazardous situations in laboratories where pathogenic micro-organisms are used, whether or not genetically modified. Alternatively, a low incidence of LAIs may indicate that current biosafety regulations and practices are actually effective. In this context, COGEM commissioned a research project aiming to provide insight into monitoring of LAIs. The project consists of: • a review of the regulatory framework on monitoring of LAIs in Europe and in some other countries; • the occurrence of LAIs as reported in the literature; and • findings and recommendations from stakeholders engaged in maintaining biosafety. The report comprehensively describes the possibilities and restrictions of LAI monitoring. The Advisory Committee endorses the view of the researchers that monitoring of LAIs is essential to gain insight into the effectiveness of current biosafety measures and to draw lessons for further biosafety optimization. In this regard, blame-free reporting of LAIs is essential. A remarkable finding is that LAIs with genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) hardly seem to occur. This is likely due to the inherent safe nature of GMOs (“biological containment”), whether or not in combination with adherence to effective safety measures. Most of the reported LAIs are infections with wild-type, non-genetically modified, pathogenic micro-organisms occurring in diagnostic and research laboratories. The Advisory Committee highly recommends this report for your consideration. It contains valuable insights and important recommendations with regard to optimization of LAI monitoring and biosafety.

Tjeerd G. Kimman Chair of the Advisory Committee

%I COGEM %C Bilthoven, The Netherlands %P 96 %8 Jan 2018 %G eng %U https://www.cogem.net/index.cfm/nl/publicaties/publicatie/monitoring-of-laboratory-acquired-infections? %N CGM 2018-01 %0 Report %D 2016 %T Airtightness in Belgian high biocontainment facilities %A Fanny Coppens %A Nicolas Willemarck %A Philippe Herman %K airtightness %K biosafety %K BSL-3 %K Recommendations %X

Following a discussion in 2011 at the meeting of the European Joint Enforcement Group of Contained Use & Deliberate release of GMOs (EEP2011) about the current situation on airtightness in highcontainment facilities throughout Europe, the Biosafety and Biotechnology Unit (SBB) of the Belgian Scientific Institute of Public Health (WIV-ISP) decided to survey the biosafety officers of institutions with facilities of biosafety level 31 (BSL-3) in Belgium, and offered the possibility to measure the airtightness of their high-containment area by means of a blower-door test (norm NBN EN 13829:2001). Four institutions, representing different construction types, were selected. These were a newly built and state-of-the-art facility, a box-in-a-box renovation, a thorough renovation with conventional building techniques, and a superficially renovated animal facility. The present report summarises the main fumigation techniques commercially available for decontamination and the techniques that were used for measuring the airtightness, as well as the results of the airtightness tests obtained in the different facilities, and provides some recommendations to achieve optimal airtightness.

%I WIV-ISP %C Brussels %P 14 %8 1/6/2016 %@ D/2016/2505/14 %G eng %M D/2016/2505/14 %1

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%& 1 %0 Report %D 2009 %T Inrichtingen met een hoog inperkingsniveau in België. Rapport: Periode 1995-2008 %A Chuong Dai Do Thi %A Bernadette Van Vaerenbergh %A Philippe Herman %A Katia Pauwels %A Fanny Coppens %A Amaya Leunda %A Verheust,C. %K België %K de %K GGM %K L3 %K pathogen %K risicoklasse 3 %K SBB %X Het doel van dit rapport bestaat erin een stand van zaken van de inrichtingen met een hoog inperkingsniveau in België op te maken. Het gaat om inrichtingen waar het ingeperkte gebruik van genetisch gemodificeerde en/of pathogene (micro-)organismen van risicoklasse 3 plaatsvindt. De gegevens in dit rapport hebben betrekking op de periode 1995-2008 %I WIV-ISP %C Brussels %P 31 %8 0/0/2009 %@ D/2009/2505/40 %G eng %1 2793 %& 1 %0 Report %D 2009 %T Les installations de haut niveau de confinement en Belgique. Rapport: Période 1995 - 2008 %A Chuong Dai Do Thi %A Bernadette Van Vaerenbergh %A Philippe Herman %A Katia Pauwels %A Fanny Coppens %A Amaya Leunda %A Verheust,C. %K Belgique %K classe de risque 3 %K Confinement %K de %K L3 %K LE %K MGM %K objectives %K pathogène %K SBB %K utilisation %X Ce rapport a pour objectif de présenter l'état de la question sur les installations de haut niveau deconfinement en Belgique. Il s'agit des installations où se déroulent des utilisations confinées de (micro)-organismes génétiquement modifiés et/ou pathogènes de classe de risque 3. Les données exposéesdans ce rapport couvrent la période de 1995 à 2008 %I WIV-ISP %C Brussels %P 31 %8 0/0/2009 %@ D/2009/2505/40 %G eng %1 2792 %& 1 %0 Report %D 2008 %T Emploi d'appareils de protection respiratoire durant l'utilisation confinée d'organismes génétiquement modifiés et/ou pathogènes %A Katia Pauwels %A Fanny Coppens %A Verheust,C. %A Bernadette Van Vaerenbergh %A Chuong Dai Do Thi %A Philippe Herman %K a %K aspects %K ce %K CONTACT %K danger %K de %K Decision %K EN %K LE %K mask %K objectives %K ON %K PAR %K pathogen %K pathogène %K protection %K réglementation %K risques %K santé %K santé publique %K SBB %K Technique %K Type %K website %X Ce document a pour but de donner un aperçu des critères de décision qui mènent au choix d'uneprotection respiratoire en cas d'exposition aux aérosols infectieux durant l'utilisation confinéed'organismes pathogènes et/ou génétiquement modifiés.Il est clair que ce sujet a plusieurs points communs avec la réglementation en matière deprotection du travailleur, qui stipule que les employeurs sont tenus de protéger leurs employéscontre tout danger. Pour ce faire, des équipements de protection individuelle doivent êtreutilisés lorsque les risques ne peuvent être évités ou suffisamment limités par des moyenstechniques de protection collective ou par des mesures, méthodes ou procédés d'organisation dutravail (Cadre 1).On entend par équipement de protection individuelle tout équipement destiné à être porté outenu par le travailleur en vue de le protéger contre un ou plusieurs risques susceptibles demenacer sa sécurité ou sa santé au travail, ainsi que tout complément ou accessoire destiné à cetobjectif.Les masques sont donc principalement des équipements de protection individuelle destinés auxpersonnes rentrant en contact avec de l'air contaminé. Dans certains cas, le port d'un masqueconfère également une protection supplémentaire pour la santé publique et/ou l'environnement.Dans le cadre des arrêtés régionaux (1, 2, 3) relatifs à l'utilisation confinée d'organismesgénétiquement modifiés et/ou pathogènes, ces deux derniers aspects doivent également être prisen compte pour le choix du type de masque. %I Scientific Institute of Public Health %C Brussels %V D/2008/2505/01 %P 27 %8 0/0/2008 %G eng %1 38839 %& 1 %0 Report %D 2007 %T Gebruik van ademhalingsbeschermingsmiddelen bij het ingeperkt gebruik van genetisch gemodificeerde organismen en/of pathogenen %A Katia Pauwels %A Fanny Coppens %A Verheust,C. %A Bernadette Van Vaerenbergh %A Chuong Dai Do Thi %A Philippe Herman %K AAN %K Aerosols %K blootstelling %K de %K gebruik %K gezondheid %K IS %K mask %K pathogen %K risico %K SBB %K Type %K website %X Dit document heeft als doel een overzicht te geven van beslissingscriteria die leiden tot de keuzevan type ademhalingsbeschermingsmiddelen bij blootstelling aan infectieuze aerosols tijdenshet ingeperkt gebruik van pathogene en/of genetisch gemodificeerde organismen.Uiteraard heeft dit onderwerp verschillende raakvlakken met de regelgeving inzakebescherming van de werknemer. Werkgevers zijn namelijk wettelijk verplicht hun werknemerstegen gevaren te beschermen, zeker wanneer de risico's onvoldoende door collectievetechnische beschermingsmiddelen of werkprocedures kunnen worden beperkt (Kader 1).Persoonlijke beschermingsmiddelen (PBM) worden dan ook gedefinieerd als iedere uitrustingdie bestemd is om door de gebruiker gedragen of vastgehouden te worden ten einde hem tebeschermen tegen één of meer risico's die zijn veiligheid of gezondheid op het werk kunnenbedreigen, alsmede als alle aanvullingen of accessoires die daartoe kunnen bijdragen.Maskers zijn dus op de eerste plaats bedoeld als persoonlijk beschermingsmiddel voor personendie in aanraking komen met besmette lucht. In sommige gevallen biedt het dragen van eenmasker echter ook een bijkomende bescherming voor de volksgezondheid en/of het leefmilieu. %I Scientific Institute of Public Health %C Brussels %V 2007/2505/64 %P 28 %8 0/0/2007 %G eng %1 38838 %& 1