


OVERZICHT VAN HET ZOONOTISCH PROFIEL VAN DE AZIATISCHE HP H5NX STAMMEN SINDS 2004

REVUE DU PROFIL ZOONOTIQUE ÉVOLUTIF DES SOUCHES ASIATIQUES DE HP-H5NX DEPUIS 2004


.be

HP H5 family introduction


Back in time




HP H5-GsGd family



AI paradigm 1



HP H5 sporadic 'spill-over'





HP H5N1 ‘spill-over’


Cumulative number of confirmed human cases for avian influenza A(H5N1) reported to WHO, 2003-2021

Country	2003-2009*		2010-2014*		2015-2019*		2020		2021		Total
	cases	deaths	cases	deaths	cases	deaths	cases	deaths	cases	deaths	
Azerbaijan	8	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bangladesh	1	0	6	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cambodia	9	7	47	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Canada	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
China	38	25	9	5	6	1	0	0	0	0	0
Djibouti	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Egypt	90	27	120	50	149	43	0	0	0	0	359
Indonesia	162	134	35	31	3	3	0	0	0	0	200
Iraq	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Lao People's Democratic Republic	2	2	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	2
Myanmar	1	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	1
Nepal	0	0	0	0	1	1	-	-	-	-	1
Nigeria	1	1	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	1
Pakistan	3	1	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	3
Thailand	25	17	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	25
Turkey	12	4	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	12
Viet Nam	112	57	15	7	0	0	-	-	-	-	112
Total	468	282	233	125	160	48					1120

Count of Human A(H5N1) Cases by Age Group, 2003 - 2013



Easily spread
Rarely fatal



Spreads slowly
Often fatal

* 2003-2009, 2010-2014 and 2015-2019 total figures. Breakdowns by year available on subsequent tables.

Total number of cases includes number of deaths.

WHO reports only laboratory-confirmed cases.


All dates refer to onset of illness

Source: WHO/GIP, data in HQ as of 22 June 2021



Zoonotic potential of the CLADE 2.3.4.4.B circulating in Europe?

°2008 From clade 2.3.4 H5N1 (A/wild duck/Hunan/211/2005)

Gs/Gd reassortments
→ groups A-H



B. H5N8 China 2013+14, Korea 2014, EU since 2016-2017 season



CLADE 2.3.4.4.B Europe Species affected

> 80 species affected

- Wild waterfowl families, Swans and Geese, remain

- Prolonged circulation Unnoticed circulation

Need for active monitoring?

- Shift in species: 2005 – 2016 – 2020

⇒ Swans and Raptors: “early warning/sentinels”

⇒ Dabbling ducks as carrier?

⇒ Rethink species lists


- Link to initial population affected?

Flexibility to allow understanding of changing epidemiology

Table 1. Wild birds species involved in the HPAI epidemic, by order and number of cases

Species	Order	number of cases
Barnacle goose (<i>Branta leucopsis</i>)	Anseriformes	196
Greylag goose (<i>Anser anser</i>)	Anseriformes	93
Eurasian wigeon (<i>Mareca penelope</i>)	Anseriformes	66
Mute swan (<i>Cygnus olor</i>)	Anseriformes	58
Common buzzard (<i>Buteo buteo</i>)	Accipitriformes	30
Mallard duck (<i>Anas platyrhynchos</i>)	Anseriformes	28
European herring gull (<i>Larus argentatus</i>)	Charadriiformes	16
Gull (Laridae)	Charadriiformes	14
Curlew (<i>Numenius arquata</i>)	Charadriiformes	13
Peregrine falcon (<i>Falco peregrinus</i>)	Falconiformes	10
Taiga bean goose (<i>Anser fabalis</i>)	Anseriformes	8
Eurasian teal (<i>Anas crecca</i>)	Anseriformes	8
Brent goose (<i>Branta bernicla</i>)	Anseriformes	8
Black-headed gull (<i>Chroicocephalus ridibundus</i>)	Charadriiformes	7
Canada goose (<i>Branta canadensis</i>)	Anseriformes	7
Eurasian eagle-owl (<i>Bubo bubo</i>)	Strigiformes	6
Greater white-fronted goose (<i>Anser albifrons</i>)	Anseriformes	5
Wild black swan (<i>Cygnus atratus</i>)	Anseriformes	5
Unspotted wild bird		5
Common kestrel (<i>Falco tinnunculus</i>)	Falconiformes	4
Common eider (<i>Somateria mollissima</i>)	Anseriformes	3
Great black-backed gull (<i>Larus marinus</i>)	Charadriiformes	3
Accipitriformes (Accipitriformes)	Accipitriformes	3
Pink-footed goose (<i>Anser brachyrhynchus</i>)	Anseriformes	3
Eurasian sparrowhawk (<i>Accipiter nisus</i>)	Accipitriformes	2
Northern shoveler (<i>Spatula clypeata</i>)	Anseriformes	2
White-tailed eagle (<i>Haliaeetus albicilla</i>)	Accipitriformes	2
Common shelduck (<i>Tadorna tadorna</i>)	Anseriformes	1
Northern pintail (<i>Anas acuta</i>)	Anseriformes	1
Egyptian goose (<i>Alopochen aegyptiaca</i>)	Anseriformes	1
Whooper swan (<i>Cygnus cygnus</i>)	Anseriformes	1
Gadwall (<i>Mareca strepera</i>)	Anseriformes	1
Shelduck (Anatidae)	Anseriformes	1
Eurasian oystercatcher (<i>Haematopus ostralegus</i>)	Charadriiformes	1
Curlew sandpiper (<i>Calidris ferruginea</i>)	Charadriiformes	1
Falcon (Falconidae)	Falconiformes	1
Strigiformes (Strigiformes)	Strigiformes	1
Short-eared owl (<i>Asio flammeus</i>)	Strigiformes	1
Tawny owl (<i>Strix aluco</i>)	Strigiformes	1
Gruidae (Gruiformes)	Gruiformes	1
Common crane (<i>Grus grus</i>)	Gruiformes	1
Common moorhen (<i>Gallinula chloropus</i>)	Gruiformes	1
Common coot (<i>Fulica atra</i>)	Gruiformes	1
Great cormorant (<i>Phalacrocorax carbo</i>)	Suliformes	1
Northern gannet (<i>Morus bassanus</i>)	Suliformes	1
Eurasian magpie (<i>Pica pica</i>)	Passeriformes	1
Common pheasant (<i>Phasianus colchicus</i>)	Galliformes	1
Unspotted Charadriidae	Charadriiformes	1
Great crested grebe (<i>Podiceps cristatus</i>)	Podicipediformes	1
Common wood pigeon (<i>Columba palumbus</i>)	Columbiformes	1

2020-2021_clade 2.3.4.4.B HP H5Nx in Belgium



2020-2021 season CLADE 2.3.4.4.B Mammalian cases

Bird flu: Russia detects first case of H5N8 bird flu in humans

① 2 days ago

December 2020



Russia has reported the first case of a bird flu strain, H5N8, being passed from poultry to humans.

UK: Avian influenza H5N8 strain detected in seals and fox



18 March, 2021



[99.9%] identical to **avian-origin H5N8**
mute swans
wildlife rescue centre
33 AA's

November 2020

Sweden, H5N8 in a grey seal
March 2021



Home > News > WBVR tests foxes positive for bird flu (H5N1) >

100% identical to local HP H5N1 wb strains

News BRAIN

WBVR tests foxes positive for bird flu (H5N1)

May, 2021

Human molecular markers

Amino acid	Avian	Human	Refs
Gene segment PB2			
271	T	A	60,125
590	G	S	96-100
591	Q	R	96-100
627	E	K	66,87
701	D	N	83-86
Gene segment HA (H1)			
190	E	D	33,18
225	G	D	33,18
Gene segment HA (H2 and H3)			
226	G	S	33,18
228	Q	L	33,18
192	R	G	33,18
226	Q	L	33,18

HA, haemagglutinin; PB2, polymerase basic protein 2.

Taken from Long et al, Nature reviews, 2019



Clade 2.3.4.4. EU 2020-2021

PB2 D701N	UK mammals H5N8, Dec 2020	↑ replication in upper resp tract mammalian cells, and increased virulence in mice
	Po duck and geese H5N8, May 2021	
PB2 E627K	Sw Grey Seal, H5N8, Mar 2021	↑ replication in upper resp tract and virulence mammals
	Ro chickens H5N5, Febr 2021	



RISK ASSESSMENT: Zoonotic potential of the CLADE 2.3.4.4.B circulating in Europe?

- ❖ Intense circulation
 - Genetic variability: Reassortment + Mutation
 - Shared habitat wild/domestic birds and mammals
- ❖ Clinical healthy infected wild birds!! (EU season 2020-2021 / Russia 2021-2022)
 - Persistance in wild birds and environment! ►Continued outbreaks/Herd Immunity/disappearance?
- ❖ Avian type receptor preference maintained
 - °'13: >2800 close contacts 31 countries, eg culling activities: NO transmission to humans
- ❖ Sporadic
 - transmission to mammals
 - detection of mammalian molecular markers



SURVEILLANCE in wild and domestic birds passive and active

Remain alert for zoonotic potential

Monitor viral evolution (genotypes, mutations, new virus introductions, ...)

Investigate dispersion

HP_H5 clade 2.3.4.4.B human health risk

WHO

- Sporadic spillover and small clusters are possible

Pandemic pre-requisites


- spillover
 - efficient replication*: change receptor/pH/Temp-preference
 - no pre-existing immunity
 - efficient human-human transmission*
- *Studied in ferrets (guinea pigs) – contact+airborn ferret-ferret trm?
 - **Risk human-to-human transmission low** (general public very low, occupational: low)
 - Important to remain vigilant:

Circulation = Evolution = Risk

Surveillance of viral evolution

Awareness in human health sector

(farmers and associates, veterinarians, ...)



Taken from Long et al, Nature reviews, 2019

Avian Influenza Spill-over to humans

1996 : UK (1 conjonctivitis)	H7N7
1997 : Hong Kong SAR (18 cases/6 deaths)	H5N1
1998 : China (5 cases)	H9N2
1999 : Hong Kong SAR (2 cases)	H9N2
2002: Virginia (1 case)	H7N2
2003 : Hong Kong SAR (1 case)	H9N2
2003 : Hong Kong SAR (2 cases, 1 death)	H5N1
2003 : NL-Be : > 100 sero+-cases, 1 death	H7N7
2003: NewYork (1case)	H7N2
2003-2014 : Eurasia : 650 cases, 386 deaths	H5N1
2004: Canada (2 cases: LP/HP)	H7N3
2007: UK, Wales (4 cases: conj+ILI)	H7N2
2007: HK (1 case)	H9N2
2013: Asia/China	H7N9
2013: Asia/China	H10N8
2013: HK (1case)	H9N2

↑ trend

OTHER HUMAN INFECTIONS

HP H5N6 (°2014) 42 lab confirmed cases (12 August 2021) (Clade 2.3.4.4.a,b,d,g,h)

22 deaths, 52%

>50% contains PB2E627K or D701 substitution

H7N4

1 lab confirmed case (14 Fe



H7N9 (early 2013)

Clade	Year(s)	Number of human sequences	Country
2.3.4.4	2014-2015	6	China
2.3.4.4a	2014	1	China
2.3.4.4b	2017 and 2020	2	China, Russia
2.3.4.4d	2015, 2016	9	China
2.3.4.4e	2014, 2015	3	China
2.3.4.4g	2016	2	China
2.3.4.4h	2017, 2018, 2020, 2021	10	China

33 HPAI's (14 Feb 2017)

no increase in transmissibility to and between humans

H9N2 (12/2015) 57 cases lab confirmed cases (23 August 2021), mild

H10N3 1 lab confirmed case (June 2021)

**Most sporadic human cases ~ close contact with poultry
Likelihood Human-Human spread LOW**

VIGILANCE FOR
VIRAL/EPIDEMIOLOGICAL/CLINAL
EVOLUTION

CLOSE MONITORING OF HUMAN
CASES AND
STUDY OF HUMAN ISOLATS

H9N2, the devil in disguise?

Circulating in Asia since 1994

Enzootic in poultry populations in parts of Africa,

Asia

the Middle East

Widespread circulation in poultry, with wild bird ancestor

Poultry pathology Respiratory problems

Drop in egg-production

Can affect shell quality

Diarrhoea

Delivered the 6 internal genes for

the H7N9 LP

Human

the H5N1 HP

Human/Poultry

the H10N8 LP

Human

CONCLUSION

Influenza as a zoonosis


There is a **huge reservoir** of antigenically variable influenza A viruses in wild birds

Humans may become **infected** either directly or indirectly (intermediate hosts/environment)

Human infections result mostly in minor **clinical symptoms** and limited **human to human transmission**

Severe clinical symptoms are mostly linked to underlying infections/diseases

The potential



to result in the emergence of a **pandemic virus**

is present