Health economics of cancer

Lieven Annemans


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SCIENSANO February 26, 2019



The key principles of a good health care system






Wise investments, no waste, no exuberant profits




What health economists do






Example: cost per capita of cancer care






Ramon Luengo-Fernandez, Jose Leal, Alastair Gray, Richard Sullivan. Lancet Oncology October 2013

Monthly and Median Costs of Cancer Drugs at the Time of FDA Approval 1965-2015



Source: Peter B. Bach, MD, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center





GHENT Jönsson et al. European Journal of Cancer 66 (2016)

The current 'debate' about cancer therapies



The difficult exercise:






Healthcare access for all

Highly specialized therapies (HST)

- i. constitute <u>a public good</u>, because they prevent or cure diseases and/or improve quality of life and because healthy people function better as members of society than sick ones do
- ii. carry a moral weight that most privately traded goods do not, for there is a widespread belief that people have a right to health care (art. 25 human rights) that they do not have to smartphones or trainers
- iii. are developed by firms aiming at profit maximization

What health economists do





Public Pricing of cancer medicines = basically two options

- "cost+" price → price justified by costing structure.
 - ©acceptable mark-up as compensation for the costs of investment in R&D
 - difficult to assess the true cost of R&D (what about failures?)
 - wrong incentives ('spend a lot on R&D')
 - added value not sufficiently recognized
- Value based pricing
 - © Better added value is recognized by better rewarding
 - profit margin may not be in reasonable proportion to the cost structure
 - evidence may not be sufficiently convincing at launch




Proposal Uyl - de Groot - Löwenberg






Value based → Cost-effectiveness





(QALYs)

QALY = Quality Adjusted Life Years





How much are we willing to pay for a QALY?



suppose: a new therapy

COST

EFFECTS

60,000€

3 QALYs







→ 20,000€/QALY





Suppose a new therapy (2)

COST

EFFECTS

100,000€ 0.5 QALYs







⇒ 200,000€/QALY





Policy & practice

Cost-effectiveness thresholds: pros and cons

Melanie Y Bertram,^a Jeremy A Lauer,^a Kees De Joncheere,^a Tessa Edejer,^a Raymond Hutubessy,^a Marie-Paule Kieny^a & Suzanne R Hill^a

Bull World Health Organ 2016;94:925–930

Cost-effectiveness information should be used alongside other considerations in a transparent decision-making process, rather than in isolation based on a single threshold value.



Many possible criteria in HTA


- 1. Efficacy (can it work?)
- 2. Effectiveness (does it work?)
- 3. Safety/toxicity
- 4. Patient reported outcomes
- 5. Epidemiology (n of people suffering)
- 6. Unmet medical/therapeutical need
- 7. Current (issues with) management of the disease
- 8. Cost-effectiveness
- 9. Budget impact
- 10. Organisational aspects

NL: first attempt for adapted thresholds

Willingness

Zorginstituut NI (ZIN): variable threshold


- €80,000 per QALY for severe condition, even up to €100,000 at end-of life
- €50,000 per QALY for moderate burden
- €20,000 per QALY for mild burden



ZIN. Kosteneffectiviteit in de praktijk | 26 juni 2015



Prospective health and expected health losses





Linemark et al. July 2014. Cost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation 12(1):16

BUT: Cost-effectiveness of some orphan drugs

Table 1. Preliminary cost per quality-adjusted life year incremental cost–effectiveness ratio estimates by NICE (2008).

Condition	Prevalence (England)	Product	ICER (preliminary estimated £ per QALY)
M. Gaucher type I and III	270	Imiglucerase (Ceredase®)	391,200
MPS type 1	130	Laronidase (Aldurazyme®)	334,900
M. Fabry	200	Agalsidase beta (Fabrazyme®)	203,000
Hemophilia B	350	Nonacog alpha (BeneFIX®)	172,500
M. Gaucher type I	270	Miglustat (Zavesca®)	116,800

These examples from England illustrate the mismatch between ultra-orphan drug cost and conventional cost–effectiveness benchmarks as adopted by NICE (i.e., £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY gained) [8].

ICER: Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; MPS: Mucopolysaccharidosis; QALY: Quality-adjusted life year.

Schlander et al, *J. Comp. Eff. Res.* (2014) 3(4), 399–422

Budget impact

"The economic and equity rationale for carrying out budget impact analyses is <u>opportunity cost</u> = benefits forgone by using resources in one way rather than another"

Cohen et al (2008)

→ There is a need for economic evaluations to address the issue on how to allocate resources *efficiently*, and for budget impact studies to address the issue of *affordability*


- → Need for well documented estimates at population level!
- → Need for very clear description of the target population
- → Need for a stratified approach wherever possible



Value Informed & Affordable Prices

GHENT





NICE gets go-ahead to fast-track more drug approvals

Treatments deemed to provide significant QALY benefits could benefit from being assessed against a maximum threshold of £300,000 per QALY.


This upper limit is ten times higher than the standard NICE threshold and is being considered in order to reflect the transformational health benefits they can offer to patients.



Many possible criteria in HTA

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- 4. Patient reported outcomes
- 5. Epidemiology (n of people suffering)
- 6. Unmet medical/therapeutical need
- 7. Current management of the disease (and the issues with current management)
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Uncertainty





Current solution: secret deals


INDUSTRY

version 1






version 2






better: outcomes based agreements



Key approaches

1.Coverage upon evidence development




- 2.Performance Linked Reimbursement (outcomes guarantee)
 - Not as good as promised → industry pays back






Types of agreements (Toumi et al 2016; n = 143)






What health economists do





Overtreatment






Introduce more episodic payments

Fixed amount per patient/insured per time period: pay to maintain health

- + decreased risk for overconsumption
- + improved access
- + more focus on prevention
- + improved quality of life health professional

Undertreatment

Postpone or cancel treatment for financial reasons





AROP = At-risk-of-poverty = income < 60% of national median

15% of the Belgian population is AROP

De medische en niet-medische kosten van kankerpatiënten

250€/mo acute; 60€/mo chronic

Jozef Pacolet, Annelies De Coninck, Georges Hedebouw, Sofie Cabus & Nele Spruytte

Projectleiding: Prof. dr. Jozef Pacolet (2011)




Too little prevention

Quality of preventive policy

- Tobacco
- Alcohol
- Nutrition
- Fertility
- Mother and child
- Infectious diseases
- Hypertension
- Cancer screening
- Traffic
- Air pollution

Mackenbach & MacKee. European Journal of Public Health, Vol. 23, No. 2, 195–344, **2013**







example: screening colorectal cancer (per 10.000 men)

Net cost:

230,000 €

Gained QALYs:

120

→ cost-effectiveness =


+/- 1,900 €/QALY





Invest much more in health promotion

Health is in all policies





Discussion

- Stick to the key pillars: quality, solidarity, sustainability
- Thresholds for societal willingness to pay needed
- Importance of medical need and budget impact in the assessment of innovations
- Dealing with uncertainty: outcomes based managed entry agreements
- Change incentives in the system to encourage health maintenance and avoid overuse
- No patient co-payments for effective and important health interventions
- Extra-proportional investment in health promotion: health in all policies

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